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INCREASING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DEFERENCE IN
CURBING ONLINE BANKING FRAUD
STEPHANIE L. TANG*

ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, online banking has gone from a seldomused, novel technology to one used by over seventy percent of all bank
account holders. While online banking may present many benefits, it also
opens up consumers to many unknown risks. Fraud is one of the biggest
risks associated with online banking. Under Article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a bank is typically not liable for losses due to fraudulent
transfers if it has followed “commercially reasonable” security procedures
to verify the transaction. Unfortunately, this issue has been sparsely
litigated in American courts, and the small handful of cases available offers
little guidance to protect either consumers or banks.
In Part II, this article summarizes the history of online banking and
presents the challenges banks face in growing consumer confidence.
Following in Part III, the article proceeds to analyze interagency guidance
on curbing online banking fraud and prior cases assessing the “commercial
reasonableness” of banking security procedures. In Part IV, the article then
explores approaches taken by the European Union and Malaysia in
combating online banking fraud and examines the crucial role of agency
deference in other areas of U.S. banking law, including bank charter
applications and the interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act. Consequently,
in Part V, this article recommends that banks and courts should give
increased deference to existing interagency guidance and look to current,
successful initiatives developed in other countries in an effort to increase
consumer confidence in online banking and to protect banks from future
liability.

* Associate Attorney at Hurst, Robin, & Kay, LLC; J.D., magna cum laude, University of
Illinois, 2015; B.A., Northwestern University, 2012. I wish to thank Summer Kim for her
mentorship and guidance, including but certainly not limited to the content of this article. I would
also like to thank my parents for their endless encouragement and Mark Scott for his undying love
and support throughout the writing process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the influx of Internet users over the past decade, online banking
has become ubiquitous and is now an integral element of the banking
experience for many consumers. A 2013 study conducted by Pew Research
Center found more than half the adults in the United States use online
banking.1 Although online banking is more popular among those ages
1. Susannah Fox, 51% of U.S. Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/.
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eighteen to twenty-nine, the study found forty-seven percent of seniors
(over age sixty-five) were online bankers as well.2 Further, the number of
people who bank online appears to be increasing. In 2014, Nielsen
Holdings published new data reporting eighty-two percent of Americans
polled stated “they banked online at least once in the past 30 days.”3 The
number of online banking users is taken into a more staggering reality when
expanded to the global scale. A 2015 study by the Federal Reserve Board
found seventy-four percent of all consumers with bank accounts bank
online.4
Why are so many consumers drawn to online banking? Among other
benefits, online banking draws consumers in with promises of cost savings,
reduced wait times, increased customization, and convenient access to
services.5 Additionally, online banking helps save consumers time by
offering online bill pay and automatic payment alerts.6 Bill Orr, editor of
CyberBanking, summarized the core benefit of online banking as “[t]he
triple anys—anytime, anywhere, anyway.”7 The focus of banks on online
banking services reflects recent consumer preference studies indicating
seventy-seven percent of Americans prefer paying bills online.8 As a result
of the increased convenience and feasibility of online banking, banks that
fail to provide online services are finding it hard to attract or retain
depositors.9
However, the ease and efficiency that draw so many consumers to
online banking come with some inevitable risks. Economists argue some
consumers may be reluctant to adopt online banking because it does not
allow consumers to witness the real-time transactions in the same way
visiting a physical bank location does.10 This reluctance leads to a general
lack of consumer confidence and trust in Internet banking.11
2. Id.
3. The Evolution of Modern Banking, NIELSEN (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www nielsen.com/
content/corporate/us/en/insights/news/2014/the-evolution-of-modern-banking html.
4. FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2015 9 (Mar. 2015),
http://www federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report201503.pdf.
5. Ali Reza Montazemi & Hamed Qahri Saremi, Factors Affecting Adoption of Internet
Banking, EUROPEAN FIN. REV. (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/
?p=623.
6. 4 Advantages of Online Banking, ACCOUNTNOW, INC. (2015), http://www.accountnow
.com/content/online-banking/4-advantages-of-online-banking-2/.
7. Jon Newberry, ‘Anytime, Anywhere, Anyway’: Online Banking Offers Greater
Convenience and Easier Financial Planning, 82 A.B.A. J. 94 (1996).
8. The Evolution of Modern Banking, supra note3.
9. See id.
10. Montazemi & Saremi, supra note 5.
11. Id.
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The lack of consumer trust in Internet banking is further exacerbated
by constant reports of online banking fraud, a problem that has plagued
online banking services from their inception.12 Shirley Inscoe, a senior
analyst with Aite Group, recently stated, “We’re hearing that the fraud has
evolved, there are new types of malware being deployed and . . . we’re
seeing that fraud spike again.”13 Inscoe observed that over the past several
years, fraudsters have become “more sophisticated” and “work a lot harder
to impersonate the customer.”14 Federal agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) have issued several alerts during this time period to warn banks
of recent cyber criminal trends.15 Nevertheless, the race to prevent online
fraud is still considered a “cat and mouse game.”16
The question then becomes: how do we protect consumers from online
banking fraud across all banks? In the United States, “allocation of losses
from fraudulent transfers is governed by Article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code” (“UCC”).17 Generally, a bank is not liable for losses if
it followed “commercially reasonable”18 security procedures to verify the
transaction.19 However, what is “commercially reasonable” has been
sparsely litigated, with only four cases issued in the United States thus far
which provide little guidance to banks regarding their potential liability.20
The high costs of judicial discretion point to the potential role for costbenefit analysis (“CBA”) by agencies within the area of online banking
fraud. By engaging in CBA, banking agencies may help build consumer
confidence and increase transparency regarding online banking fraud
prevention.21

12. See Keith Button, Wire and Online Banking Fraud Continues to Spike for Businesses,
AM. BANKER (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_194/wire-and-onlinebanking-fraud-continues-to-spike-for-businesses-1062666-1 html (discussing numerous online
banking fraud reports).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FED. BANKING L. REP. P 95-500
(C.C.H.), 2008 WL 8634530 (Oct. 28, 2008).
16. Button, supra note 12 (quoting Avivah Litan, Vice President of Gartner, Inc.).
17. Melissa Waite, Comment, In Search of the Right Balance: Patco Lays the Foundation for
Analyzing the Commercial Reasonableness of Security Procedures Under UCC Article 4A, 54
B.C. L. REV. 217, 218 (2013).
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. U.C.C. § 4A-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications 14 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 23, 2014) (noting that
even in areas where quantification is difficult, “conceptual CBA” is helpful for establishing
baselines and alternatives).
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In order for banks to achieve a balance between protecting consumers
against online banking fraud and the costs of additional safeguards, courts
should follow uniform and objective “best practices” determined by agency
experts when adjudicating liability. Part II of this article will outline the
history of online banking and the challenges banks face in building
consumer confidence in the face of online banking fraud. Part III will
review interagency guidance on curbing online banking fraud and prior
court’s assessments of what constitute “commercially reasonable” banking
security procedures. Part IV will present several comparative perspectives,
first presenting strategies employed in Europe and Malaysia in dealing with
online banking fraud, and second, presenting a short analysis of the role of
agency deference in other areas of banking law. Finally, Part V will outline
a recommendation advocating for increased deference by American banks
to existing interagency guidance documents, given the success of the
initiatives discussed in Part IV.
II. BACKGROUND
Before exploring ways to safeguard banks from liability, it is important
to understand the development of online banking and the parallel growth of
online banking fraud throughout the past decade. This Part outlines the
timeline from the inception of online banking and discusses the problems
banks now face in a perpetually evolving, technology-dependent society.
A. HISTORY OF ONLINE BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
Online banking in the United States first sprouted in New York in 1981
when four of the city’s main banks began offering home banking services
through the videotex system.22 Over the following decade, many banks
started viewing online banking as a necessary strategy to, among other
advantages, diminish transaction costs and bundle services with minimal
overhead.23 In 1995, Security First Network Bank became the nation’s first
Internet-based bank, marking a vast departure from the traditional brickand-mortar money transactions.24 That same year, Wells Fargo became the
first U.S. bank to offer account services online.25 In 1998, a large number

22. M. Edwards, Computer Giants Giving a Major Boost to Increased Use of Corporate
Videotex, COMMC’N NEWS (Oct. 1, 1984), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Computer+Giants+
Giving+a+Major+Boost+to+Increased+Use+of+Corporate. . .-a0586601.
23. Sharil Sharma, The Pragmatic Review on Internet Banking and Associated Services in
India, INT’L J. OF COMPUTING AND CORP. RES., July 2004, at 1, 3.
24. Newberry, supra note 7, at 94.
25. Sharma, supra note 23, at 5.
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of mergers and acquisitions occurred throughout the financial industry.26
These mergers and acquisitions significantly expanded banks’ customer
bases, resulting in a flood of banks turning to the Internet as a “flashy” way
of maintaining customers and building loyalty.27
Although many banks began adopting online banking services at this
time, many customers were initially reluctant to transition to electronic
However, the advent of new electronic commerce
transactions.28
companies, such as America Online, eBay, and Amazon, ultimately sold
consumers on the benefits of transacting online.29 To keep up with the
trend, eighty percent of U.S. banks offered online banking services in
2000.30 The customer base for online banking jumped drastically after the
Y2K scare ended, with consumers beginning to trust that both online
banking and the Internet as a whole were safe.31 The post-Y2K spike
highlights the importance of assured banking security in growing a
customer base for online banking services.
With growing feelings of security regarding online banking, the
number of banks offering interactive web-based services grew from six in
1996 to over six thousand in 2004.32 Over the past fifteen years, the
percentage of Internet users that bank online has jumped from less than
0.4% in 1999 to 51% in recent years.33 As of 2010, most bank customers
(36%) prefer to conduct banking online compared to any other method.34
This greatly outweighs any other method of banking, including visiting
physical branches (25%) and using Automated Teller Machines (“ATMs”)
(15%).35 It is clear from the recent trend towards online services that banks
need to prioritize security measures to maximize and ensure consumer
protection.

26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Saleh M. Nsouli & Andrea Schaechter, Challenges of the “E-Banking Revolution”, FIN.
& DEV. (Sep. 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/nsouli htm (finding that
although Singapore and Australia had the most banks offering e-banking services in 2000, they
were not among the top ten countries where e-banking was the most popular per capita).
29. Sharma, supra note 23, at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Nick Semanko, A. Electronic Banking, in 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 97, 98
(2005).
33. Compare Sharma, supra note 23, at 5, with Fox, supra note 1.
34. ABA Study: Consumers Prefer Online Banking, THE FIN. BRAND (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://thefinancialbrand.com/14005/aba-ipsos-banking-delivery-channel-survey/ (quoting findings
of a study completed by the American Bankers Association).
35. Id.
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B. OBSTACLES AND RISKS OF ONLINE BANKING
With the rapid increase of online banking services comes new obstacles
and risks facing banks offering these services. Two paramount concerns for
banks offering online banking services are building consumer confidence
and preventing phishing and other fraudulent activities.
1. Consumer Confidence
While online banking purportedly offers many advantages compared to
the traditional brick-and-mortar bank, research indicates consumers are still
reluctant to hop on board. Scholars speculate consumers view online
banking as a novelty that is not compatible with their past experience in
banking.36 Together, these factors lead to a high level of uncertainty, which
causes consumer reluctance towards engaging in online banking
relationships.37
In a 2004 study comparing Internet experts and average consumers,
eighty-one percent of experts considered online banking a low-risk activity,
but only forty-six percent of consumers agreed.38 Further, seventy percent
of experts thought online bill paying was low-risk, while only forty-one
percent of consumers agreed.39 “[A]mong [consumers] who had not banked
online, six percent cited privacy concerns, twenty-six percent cited security,
and an additional twenty-two percent said they were simply not comfortable
with the idea of banking through a computer.”40
One can argue that this same mistrust on the individual consumer level
translates, if not multiplies, to the business customer level as well. In fact,
research indicates fraudsters are increasingly targeting small to mid-sized
business bank accounts because they typically lack sophisticated security
measures in place and may have accounts with smaller community banks
that have lower levels of security.41 The story of Sign Designs, Inc. is one
particularly telling example of a small business losing a large sum of money

36. Montazemi & Saremi, supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Julie Dunn, Survey Reveals High-Risk Net Use, Few See a Problem in Giving Personal
Data to Financial Institutions Via E-mail, Which Could Open Them Up to Fraud, DENVER POST
(Aug. 17, 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Riva Richmond, Wanted: Defense Against Online Bank Fraud, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703483604574630690362605018 (“Cybercriminals have found a rich new hunting ground: small businesses’ bank accounts.”); Online
Banking Fraud: Who is Liable and How Can it be Prevented?, BNC BANK, https://
www.bncbank.com/files/OnlineBankingFraud.pdf.
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to online fraud.42 Sign Designs, an electric sign maker, had an account with
Bank of Stockton, a local community bank.43 One day in 2010, Sign
Designs logged onto its online bank account only to find almost $100,000
had been sent to seventeen mystery people the previous day.44 In its
defense, the Bank of Stockton noted that they should not be liable for the
business’ losses because Sign Designs failed to take advantage of security
measures that potentially would have avoided the loss.45 Sign Designs
represents only one of thousands of small businesses whose bank accounts
have been drained in a similar fashion.46 It is therefore critical that banks
take measures to safeguard their online banking procedures to build
necessary consumer trust.
2. Risks of Fraud
A large risk banks face when moving to the online sector is opening
themselves up to phishing. Phishing is defined as a scheme where an email induces potential victims to log-in to websites that seem legitimate.47
These emails often purport to be from, or related to, financial institutions
involved in high-profile mergers, acquisitions, or failures.48 This is a
strategy to prompt consumer attention and create a sense of urgency and
legitimacy for requesting personal information.49 Once a victim inputs a
username and password, his or her personal information is transmitted to
scammers who in turn use the information to withdraw funds or apply for
credit.50
The risk of phishing has gone up substantially over the years, with
phishers becoming more sophisticated and finding new channels to retrieve
information over the past decade. The 2008 U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Technology Incident Report compiled suspicious activity
reports filed quarterly by banks nationwide.51 The Report found 536 cases
of computer intrusion in 2007, with an average of $30,000 acquired per
transaction. A 2012 report by JP Morgan estimated the total revenue loss
from online fraud was $3.4 billion, a $700 million increase over 2010
42. Richmond, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Semanko, supra note 32, at 98.
48. FED. RESERVE BD., FED. BANKING L. REP. P 95-500 (C.C.H.), 2008 WL 8634530 (Oct.
28, 2008).
49. Id.
50. Semanko, supra note 32, at 96.
51. Sharma, supra note 23.
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results.52 These reports highlight the necessity of addressing online banking
fraud to prevent future loss in funds. Moreover, in addition to the
quantifiable cost of fraud, banks may suffer significant reputational harm
from a security breach.53
III. REGULATION OF ONLINE BANKING FRAUD IN THE UNITED
STATES54
There are two primary resources American banks can turn to when
trying to protect themselves from claims of inadequate security procedures.
The first is the Authentication Guidance published by the interagency body,
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”), which
outlines minimum-security procedures all banks should follow. The second
are the few cases American courts have adjudicated on the issue of what
constitutes a “commercially reasonable” banking security procedure under
Article 4A of the UCC. These two areas provide a basis of comparison for
banks seeking to protect themselves against future liability.
A. THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL
GUIDANCE
The FFIEC is a formal interagency body of the United States
government composed of five banking regulators: the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (“FRB”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.55 The primary role of the FFIEC is to “prescribe
uniform principles, standards, and report forms . . . to promote uniformity in
the supervision of financial institutions.”56 In May 2014, Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency and FFIEC Chair, stated that “helping to make
banks less vulnerable and more resilient to cyber-attacks” has been one of
52. 2012 Online Fraud Report, JP MORGAN, CYBERSOURCE CORP. (2012), https://www.jp
morgan.com/cm/BlobServer/13th_Annual_2012_Online_Fraud_Report.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhe
re=1320571432216&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-Control&blobheader
value1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
53. Nikil Chande, A Survey and Risk Analysis of Selected Non-Bank Retail Payments
Systems, Discussion Paper 2008-17, Bank of Canada 8 (2008), http://ideas repec.org/p/bca/
bocadp/08-17 html#author.
54. For the purposes of this paper, the author is going to primarily confine the scope of
analysis to online banking fraud with regards to the liability of banks to business customers under
the UCC. However, the author recognizes the role of Credit Rating Agencies, individual
consumers, and Automated Clearing House (“ACH”) payments in this field as well.
55. About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www ffiec.gov/
about htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
56. Id.
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the FFIEC’s top priorities.57 This focus is reflected in two major initiatives
launched by the FFIEC: (1) the launch of the FFIEC’s new website on
cyber security,58 and (2) an updated Authentication Guidance to serve as a
standard for all banks to follow.59 These resources are intended to help
institutions manage cyber security and protect consumers from risk of cyber
crimes.
The FFIEC’s 2011 Authentication Guidance updates and reinforces the
expectations set forth in the previously published 2005 FFIEC Guidance.60
The 2011 Guidance was designed to establish minimum-security
procedures all banks should follow in protecting themselves against risk of
fraud.61 These procedures include adopting authentication techniques, such
as device identification and asking challenge questions as barriers to protect
customers from fraud.62 The Guidance further stresses the effectiveness of
certain procedures over others in preventing bank fraud.63 This helps banks
and courts understand what the “best practices” are for protecting bank
customers.64
Approaching promulgation of Guidance documents this way allows the
FFIEC to conduct a form of informal CBA whereby the public is able to
understand why these agencies chose these methods as the “best.”65 This in
turn allows consumers to compare their current bank’s practices to those
recommended by the FFIEC to determine whether investing with the bank
online is a sound financial decision. By including a CBA within the
Guidance publication and weighing the pros and cons of major fraud
prevention processes, the five FFIEC agencies effectively split the cost and

57. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks by
Thomas J. Curry Comptroller of the Currency Before RMA’s Governance, Compliance, and
Operational Risk Conference 7, (May 8, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/
2014/pub-speech-2014-69a.pdf.
58. See Cybersecurity Awareness, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (Sept. 29, 2014,
9:54 AM), http://www ffiec.gov/cybersecurity htm.
59. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT TO AUTHENTICATION IN AN
INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT (June 28, 2011), http://www ffiec.gov/pdf/auth-itsfinal%206-22-11%20(ffiec%20formated).pdf.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. See, e.g., id. at 6. The Guidance finds that “simple device identification” is less effective
than using “one-time” cookies. Id. The Guidance reasons banks have found fraudsters can easily
copy cookies to their computers from banks only using simple device identification, thereby
giving them relatively easy access to users’ accounts. Id. In contrast, using “one-time” cookies
creates a more unique “fingerprint” for a customer, looking at additional factors including “PC
configuration, Internet protocol address, geolocation, and other factors. Id.
64. Id. at 1.
65. See Coates, supra note 21, at 898 (arguing a potential benefit of CBA as a whole may be
to “enhance public understanding of why regulations are adopted”).
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time of reviewing fraud prevention procedures while increasing
transparency to the public.
Other agencies have followed suit and produced written reports
supplementing the FFIEC Guidance, thereby providing further direction to
banks in risk-management strategies to pursue in preventing online banking
fraud. For example, the OCC published a bulletin building off FFIEC
reports that provided their “key components” of a payment riskmanagement system.66 Within this report, the OCC noted several “adequate
procedures” for banks to follow, including clearly defined responsibilities
over internal controls for each transaction, board approval for risk
management procedures, and procedures directly proportional to the scope
and complexity of a given bank’s procedures.67 In this way, the OCC again
weighed potential costs and benefits of certain fraud prevention procedures
and gave its recommendations for banks and consumers to consider.
Critics argue courts may rely too heavily on recommendations from
FFIEC Guidance and other agency analysis because Article 4A of the
Uniform Commercial Code simply requires courts to consider whether a
particular banking procedure is reasonable for the particular bank, not
“whether the security procedure is the best available.”68 Comment 4 to
UCC Article 4A-203 notes, “The concept of what is commercially
reasonable in a given case is flexible,” indicating there are likely differences
in what is a “commercially reasonable” security procedure in a small rural
bank versus a more sophisticated urban bank.69 To respond to this concern,
courts should take measures such as, using this example, holding urban
banks with a larger consumer base and more complex financial transactions
to a higher standard of security than their smaller rural counterparts.
B. CASES ASSESSING THE “COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS” OF
ONLINE BANKING PROCEDURES TO PREVENT BANKING FRAUD
In the United States, the allocation of losses from fraudulent bank
transfers or business customers is governed by Article 4A of the UCC.70

66. Description: Risk Management Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2006-39, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/
2006/bulletin-2006-39 html (last updated Oct. 23, 2013).
67. Id.
68. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
69. Id.
70. See id § 4A. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act and Regulation E provide that individual
consumers receive heightened protection against unauthorized transfers from their bank account.
However, this Act does not apply to business customers. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §
226 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1601-03 (2012); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012);
Richmond, supra note 41.
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Generally, under the UCC, a bank is not liable for losses if it followed
“commercially reasonable” security procedures to verify the transactions,
and the bank followed those procedures in good faith.71 While this standard
is codified, it is so sparsely litigated that banks have a difficult time
knowing what security procedures they need to have in place in order to
protect themselves. As of 2015, only four cases have analyzed what
constitutes “commercially reasonable” online banking security procedures.
To decide what is “commercially reasonable,” the UCC directs courts to
consider “the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the
circumstances of the customer known to the bank, including the size, type,
and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the
bank . . . and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving
banks similarly situated.”72 While this is a good starting place, it becomes
evident when looking at the case law that courts are still confused as to
what the threshold requirements are for a given bank’s security procedures.
The first case where a court reviewed a bank’s security procedure was
in Regatos v. North Fork Bank.73 The bank’s procedure entailed sending a
signed order to the bank by fax, a confirmatory phone call between the
customer and a sole bank officer, and a signature comparison between the
faxed order and a signature card.74 The Regatos court found the procedure
was commercially reasonable because the bank employee could recognize
the customer’s voice as he had dealt with him repeatedly over several
years.75
Next, in Filho v. Interaudi Bank, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York evaluated another multi-layered security
procedure.76 This procedure paralleled the one in Regatos in that it
consisted of a logged and recorded telephone confirmation with the
customer, who was required to correctly answer security questions before
the bank would release the funds.77 The Filho court found the bank’s
security procedure was commercially reasonable because the additional
verification provided by the security questions compensated for the lack of
voice recognition.78 Like the court in Regatos, the Filho court focused on
the importance for banks to implement multifactor authentication in their

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmts. 3-4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
U.C.C. § 4A-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
257 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 646
Id.
No. 03 Civ. 4795(SAS), 2008 WL 1752693, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
Id. at 5.
Id.
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security procedures.79 In Regatos, the court’s determination of commercial
reasonableness hinged on the bank’s use of an outside voice recognition
confirmation method.80 Similarly, in Filho, the court’s holding that the
bank’s procedure was commercially reasonable was based on the dual
components of an out-of-bank authentication procedure and a knowledgebased requirement (the security question).81 Consequently, these cases
suggest it is crucial for banks to adopt security measures with multiple
verification processes in order to protect themselves against liability for
fraudulent transfers. However, one important limitation of the applicability
of these cases today is that Regatos and Filho both addressed wire transfers
by fax, a practice that has recently lost popularity amongst banks.
The Texas Court of Appeals in All American Siding & Windows, Inc. v.
Bank of America, N.A. affirmed the emphasis on layered security measures
in the context of online ACH payments.82 In this case, Bank of America’s
procedure consisted of a personalized ID, passcode, and digital certificate
verification technology.83 The court found the security procedure was
commercially reasonable for ACH payments submitted via online banking
because, among other reasons, the bank adhered to the 2005 FFIEC
Guidance.84 Further, the court noted Bank of America acted in good faith
because there was no evidence in the record that the bank had received the
required paperwork to confirm a fraudulent transaction had occurred.85
While the bank did reference the 2005 FFIEC Guidance, it was only a
cursory reference, and it was left unclear to what extent the court
considered the contents of the Guidance in reaching its decision.86
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
evaluated the commercial reasonableness of online banking security
procedures in Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank.87 Unlike
Regatos, Filho, and All American Siding & Windows, Inc., the court for the
first time found the bank’s security procedures were not commercially
reasonable as a matter of law.88 The bank’s security procedure proceeded
as follows. First, each client was assigned a unique ID and password, and
then each client provided personalized answers for the challenge
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Filho, 2008 WL 1752693, at *5
367 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App. 2012).
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
684 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2012).
Id. at 211.
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questions.89 The system would ask challenge questions to confirm a
client’s identity and installed a digital certificate on the device for future
authentication.90 Further, the online system would require clients to answer
one of their preset challenge questions any time a transaction amount
exceeded one dollar.91 In analyzing this dollar threshold, the court reasoned
that it substantially increased the risk of fraud for any clients who initiated
frequent, routine transfers.92 “[T]he increase in risk,” the court argued,
“was sufficiently serious to require a corollary increase in security measures
. . . .”93 The lack of additional security measures to account for the
increased risk was a red flag indicating the procedures were not
commercially reasonable.
In addition to faulting the bank for not implementing additional
security measures proportional to the higher levels of risk, the Patco court
also reprimanded the bank for its failure to implement widely available
security procedures that other banks had implemented.94 As in All
American Siding & Windows, Inc., the court analyzed security devices
advocated for in the 2005 FFIEC Guidance for online banking procedures
and found the bank’s process did not adequately follow the Guidance’s
recommendations.95 For example, the court noted that bank employers
never monitored the risk scores that their online system generated, whereas
many other banks had employees monitoring risk scores and verifying highscoring transactions.96
The court’s ruling in this case summarizes the two takeaways banks
may pull from the limited case law on commercial reasonableness. First,
any additional exposure to risk may warrant consideration of additional
security procedures in a given bank. Second, courts so far have taken a
comparative approach in determining whether a given bank’s security
procedures are commercially reasonable by looking at agency guidance and
similarly situated banks. With this in mind, it is important to remember that
these cases are few and far between, so there is still considerable leeway for
further clarification by the court.
One potential method of how this wide discretion could be narrowed is
by taking the approach of the courts in All American Siding & Windows,

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-203.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
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Inc. and Patco in noting banks’ compliance with the guidelines set forth by
the FFIEC. Even in these cases, the bank simply noted the existence of the
Guidance without going into an in-depth discussion of the weight the
Guidance had on their decision. These cases serve to highlight the costs of
only having judicial discretion without any substantial agency or expert
deference. Without clear standards for liability, banks are arguably hesitant
to invest in procedures in which there is no clearly defined benefit. In turn,
consumers are hesitant to invest in online banking for fear their assets will
not be properly protected.
Further, it is important to quickly note here the distinction between
federal and state banks within the U.S. banking system. The United States
has a unique “dual banking” system, with parallel and co-existing state and
federal banking systems.97 On the most elementary level, the federal
banking system is based on a federal bank charter and defined under federal
law, whereas state banks are characterized by state chartering with powers
characterized under state law.98 As discussed above, judicial determination
of bank liability for online banking fraud under the federal system is
already inconsistent and arbitrary. Given the inconsistencies that exist at
the federal level, the inconsistencies will likely only multiply on the state
bank level, making it even more difficult for banks to avoid liability if sued
for losses from security breaches by business customers.
C. STALL OF ANTI-PHISHING LEGISLATION
Besides the FFIEC Guidance, Congress has taken several steps to
impose penalties on creators of computer spyware that facilitates phishing.
First, the United States House of Representatives passed the Internet
Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007 in May 2007.99 The Act has yet
to pass in the Senate.100 The Act, if passed, “would make it illegal to access
a PC without authorization or to exceed authorized access by copying
software to code to further another criminal act, impair security procedures,
or steal the personal or financial information of another end-user.”101 It
97. Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks, National Banks and The
Dual Banking System, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY 1 (2003), http://www.occ.
gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/national-banks-and-the-dualbanking-system.pdf.
98. Id.
99. William Jackson, House Passes Bill To Criminalize Spyware Fraud, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, Oct. 8, 2004, http://gcn.com/articles/2004/10/08/house-passes-bill-to-criminalizespyware-fraud.aspx.
100. See Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 110th Cong. (2007).
101. Frank Washkuch, Jr., I-SPY Act Passes House, but Anti-Spyware Legislation Faces
Tough Hurdle in Senate, SC MAG. (May 23, 2007), http://www.scmagazine.com/i-spy-act-passeshouse-but-anti-spyware-legislation-faces-tough-hurdle-in-senate/article/35033/.

344

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:329

appears the Act may have reached a standstill in the Senate, with
commentators speculating this may stem from the Act’s failure to focus on
the enforcement of anti-spyware measures.102
Second, the House passed the Security Protect Yourself Against Cyber
Trespass Act, or SPY Act, on June 6, 2007.103 This bill differed from the ISPY Act because the SPY Act “prohibits any deceptive or unauthorized use
of spyware.”104 However, the Senate, again, did not pass the bill.105 With
Congress stalling action on these and similar acts, it appears banks will
likely be unable to turn to anti-phishing legislation for guidance in the near
future. With judicial discretion proving too arbitrary and Congressional
action proving fruitless, increased deference to the FFIEC appears to be the
most promising course of action in helping protect both banks and
consumers.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In determining the feasibility and effectiveness of increased FFIEC
deference in protecting banks from being held liable for fraudulent
transactions, it is helpful to look both at other countries’ approaches to the
problem as well as the prevalence of agency deference in other areas of
banking law. This Part will first discuss the salient features of the
initiatives set forth in Europe and Malaysia for fraud protection and the role
key expert organizations have played in promulgating and promoting each
of these initiatives.106 It will then turn to agency deference in other areas of
banking law to demonstrate viability of agency deference in online banking
fraud prevention. Together, these comparative points boost the argument
for increased deference to the FFIEC in determining reasonable online
banking security procedures.

102. Id.
103. Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act or Spy Act, H.R. 964, 110th
Cong. (2007).
104. Jackson, supra note 99.
105. See Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act or Spy Act, H.R. 964, 110th
Cong. (2007).
106. These two examples are not meant to serve as a comprehensive representation of fraud
prevention strategies. The author chose to analyze the Single Euro Payments Area because it
addresses fraud prevention through unification of systems of credit and debit transfers across
multiple countries in developed economies, much like the unification the author is proposing for
banking systems across state borders in the United States. The author chose to analyze the
example of the Inter-Bank GIRO roadshows in Malaysia because these are catered on a
community level to smaller rural communities that do not have access to online banking. The
United States has similar rural areas where such unification between rural and urban systems
would prove beneficial, which is discussed in Part IV, infra.

2015]

INCREASING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DEFERENCE

345

A. PAYMENT INTEGRATION UNDER THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS
AREA
The Single Euro Payments Area (“SEPA”) is a European Union (“EU”)
regulation that streamlines all electronic payments in the Euro area,
advertising “fast and secure transfers” between any bank accounts.107
SEPA spans twenty-eight EU countries and the additional European
Economic Area countries,108 and came into full effect in February 2014,
when all prior national payment schemes were closed down and replaced
with SEPA schemes.109 This means all credit transfers and direct debits in
the Euro area are made under the SEPA Credit Transfers and SEPA Direct
Debits system, respectively.110 As of August 1, 2014, most European banks
now comply with SEPA guidelines.111 The main proponents of the SEPA
initiative—EU governments, the European Parliament, the European
Commission, and the European Central Bank (“ECB”)—sought to
incentivize use of electronic payment instruments, in conjunction with
reducing the overall cost of wholesale cash distribution.112 Within SEPA,
each consumer has an International Bank Account Number (“IBAN”) and a
Business Identifier Code (“BIC”), which are required to make or receive
any Euro electronic payments.113 Having an IBAN and BIC allows you to
make and receive payments, collect a direct debit on any Euro account, and
make a credit transfer to any euro account within SEPA.114
The European Commission addressed how SEPA relates to fraud in
their October 2004 Action Plan.115 The Commission noted that before
SEPA was implemented there were ten million fraudulent transactions in

107. Questions and Answers on SEPA, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/payments/sepa/faq/index_en htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
108. EPC List of SEPA Scheme Countries, EUROPEAN PAYMENTS COUNCIL, http://
www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/index.cfm/knowledge-bank/epc-documents/epc-list-of-sepascheme-countries/epc409-09-epc-list-of-sepa-scheme-countries-v23/.
109. Banking and Finance, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/
sepa/index_en.htm.
110. Questions and Answers on SEPA, supra note 107.
111. Craig Ramsey, SEPA – Is the Burden Turning into a Benefit?, ACI UNIVERSAL
PAYMENTS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.aciworldwide.com/what-we-know/expert-view/2014/9/5/
sepa-is-the-burden-turning-into-a-benefit.aspx.
112. SEPA – Vision and Goals, EUROPEAN PAYMENTS COUNCIL, http://www.european
paymentscouncil.eu/index.cfm/about-sepa/sepa-vision-and-goals/ (last visited October 15, 2014).
113. IBAN and BIC, EUROPEAN PAYMENTS COUNCIL, http://www.europeanpayments
council.eu/index.cfm/sepa-credit-transfer/iban-and-bic/ (last visited March 31, 2016).
114. Id.
115. Fraud and Counterfeiting: Non-Cash Means of Payment, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/fraud/index_en htm#maincontentSec2 (last updated
Nov. 2, 2016).
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the SEPA area per year, amounting to approximately €1 billion in losses.116
The Commission recognized that without intervention, the high rate of
fraud might negatively impact consumer confidence in electronic payments,
especially given rapid technological developments and criminals’
adaptation to the developments as they arise.117 In light of this concern, the
Commission notably commended the SEPA Cards Framework, developed
by the European Payments Council (“EPC”).118 The Framework requires
any card scheme to support fraud prevention activities connected to EPC
resolutions on card fraud.119 Implementing this framework successfully in
the card fraud area highlights the potential benefits for other areas of online
banking fraud.
Conversely, there may be a downside to SEPA’s simplification of
monetary transactions. With all of the SEPA banks adopting the same
procedures, if a fraudster finds a way to crack one bank’s system, it could
lead to a rapid influx of hacks over a short period of time. McAfee, an
online security firm, found it was this simplification that made SEPA a
major target for fraud.120 McAfee Blogger Ryan Sherstobitoff postulated,
“Typically in these organized fraud campaigns we see a lot of mule activity
in countries other than the nation hosting the victim’s bank.”121 Another
critic, Monique Goyens, director general of the Bureau Européen des
Unions de Consommateurs, asserted, “The complete lack of security
regarding key aspects of SEPA . . . is practically a call for tender to
fraudsters. Nothing requires banks to check the reliability of the issuer of
the direct debit payment.”122
Specifically, in the fraudulent transactions McAfee identified,
fraudsters initiated SEPA credit transfers through an automated transfer
116. Comm’n of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: Report
on Fraud Regarding Non Cash Means of Payments in the EU: the Implementation of the 20042007 EU Action Plan, EUROPEAN COMM’N 6 (2008) [hereinafter EU Action Plan]
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ payments/docs/fraud/implementation_report_en.pdf.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 9; see SEPA Cards Framework Version 2.1, EUROPEAN PAYMENTS COUNCIL,
(Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/index.cfm/knowledge-bank/other-docu
ments/sepa-cards-framework-v-21/cards-scf-006-09-v-2-1pdf/.
119. EU Action Plan, supra note 116, at 9-10.
120. AFP Fraudwatch: SEPA Provides Juicy Fraud Target in Europe, ASS’N FOR FIN.
PROF’LS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://partners niceactimize.com/index.aspx?page=news608 [hereinafter
AFP Fraudwatch].
121. Id. A “money mule” is an individual who transfers illegally acquired money either in
person, or electronically, to fraudsters. Brook Satti, Emerging Trends in Money Mule Schemes,
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 11, 2014), https://securityintelligence.com/emerging-trends-inmoney-mules-schemes/.
122. Tim Wright, The Single Euro Payments Area and the Risk of Fraud, E-FIN. &
PAYMENTS L. & POL’Y 13 (Jan. 2013), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/News/EFPLP
January2013Wright.pdf.
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system, which sent a withdrawal request to the victim’s account and created
a mule account.123 In response, Ben Knieff, Director of Financial Crime
Marketing at NICE Actimize, recommends that European banks should take
additional measures to account for the increased risk of SEPA-based
payments compared to alternative payment methods.124 ACI Worldwide
also cautioned that while SEPA will allow for greater transparency for
banks across borders, this also means they will face increased risks as a
result of SEPA.125 Despite the added risk of fraud, Knieff stresses, “There
are many advantages to SEPA, and the fraud risks do not outweigh these
advantages.”126 ACI Worldwide follows Knieff’s logic by arguing the
potential impact of security failure on revenue and a bank’s customer
experience creates a business incentive for making investments in
additional security procedures.127 This way, SEPA banks can work towards
multi-channel monitoring for every consumer transaction.128 SEPA serves
as an example where another developed economy performed a CBA on
unifying credit and debit transfers and found the benefits of consolidation
with the help of expert guidance outweighed the costs.
B. A GRASSROOTS INITIATIVE FOR CONSUMER CONFIDENCE: INTERBANK GIRO
Even if courts and banks look to the factors set forth in documents such
as the FFIEC Guidance, this may not be sufficient for bank customers to
feel secure in using banking products. Malaysia highlights another way
expert banking authorities can help build consumer confidence and unify
banks’ authentication systems.129 Compared to the SEPA countries and the
United States, online banking systems are largely unused and unfamiliar in
Malaysia.130 Although seventy-four percent of all Malaysian bank account
holders have online bank accounts, only forty-three percent of this subset
actively engages in online banking transactions.131 Consequently, their

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Ramsey, supra note 111.
126. AFP Fraudwatch, supra note 120.
127. Ramsey, supra note 111.
128. Id.
129. Encik Abu Hassan Alshari Yahaya, The Benefits of Online Banking Services and InterBank GIRO (IBG) in Malaysia, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 2 (Dec. 2, 2013), http://
www.bis.org/review/r131211g.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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online bank fraud rate accounts for a mere 0.0002% of total transactions
made annually nationwide.132
Malaysian banks have adopted the Inter-Bank GIRO (“IBG”), a
paperless system through which a customer of a participating bank can
transfer funds through direct credits and debits to any other customer of
another participating bank.133 To promote adoption of the IBG system, the
Association of Banks in Malaysia (“ABM”), Bank Negara Malaysia, the
Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (“AIBIM”) and other
banking institutions organized “Experience IBG” roadshows to travel
around Malaysia.134 These roadshows provided information to consumers
and small businesses to learn the benefits of online banking and the security
checks in place by other Malaysian banks.135 Each roadshow consisted of
exhibition booths by major banks to showcase their electronic banking
systems, promotional offers for attendees who sign up for online banking,
and informational videos.136 In conjunction with the roadshows, several
major Malaysian banks held weeklong “Open Day” events, which were
intended to reach out to consumers in smaller towns.137 By gathering in one
condensed area, all participating banks were incentivized to present the
most innovative security procedures to attract attendees.
Results of this initiative indicate such methods both increase consumer
confidence in online banking, particularly in rural areas, and decrease the
rate of fraud nationwide. During the first four roadshows, sixty-six percent
of all participants signed up for online banking services.138 This suggests
that roadshow attendees learned about the benefits of online banking and
felt confident enough to sign up for online banking services as a result.139
Moreover, while many other countries are suffering from increased rates of
online banking fraud, Malaysia actually enjoyed a decline of fraudulent
transactions.140

132. Id.
133. Interbank GIRO (IBG) Procedures, ASS’N OF BANKS IN SING., http://abs.org.sg/docs/
library/ibg_procedures.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions on Interbank GIRO (IBG) Transfers,
HSBC,
https://www hsbc.com my/1/PA_ES_Content_Mgmt/content/website/pdf/personal/pib/
IBG- FAQ.pdf.
134. Yahaya, supra note 129, at 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2 (indicating losses from internet banking fraud went down from 0.0002% to
0.0001% in the first nine months of 2014).
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C. AGENCY DEFERENCE IN OTHER AREAS OF U.S. BANKING LAW
The idea of deferring to agency expertise when litigating cases is long
established in banking law as a whole. One particularly salient example of
the level of deference given to banking agencies is seen in the separation of
commercial and investment banking as defined by the Glass-Steagall
Act.141 In an article examining judicial review of legal interpretations of the
Act by the federal banking agencies (the OCC, FRB, and FDIC), the author
found that with the exception of the FRB, “courts have consistently
deferred to the banking agency’s interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act . .
. .”142 Another area where banking agencies receive a substantial level of
deference is in bank charter applications. In the representative case of
Camp v. Pitts, the Supreme Court reviewed the OCC’s denial of
respondent’s charter application under the National Bank Act.143 The Court
upheld the OCC’s decision on the grounds that the agency stated a
determinative reason for denying the new bank’s application as an
uneconomic venture.144
Specifically, courts afford banking agencies in these areas Chevron
deference in reviewing the agency’s construction of the governing statutes.
This means if a reviewing court finds Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill with a regulation, the court will defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the Act if it is based on a “permissible construction of the
statute.”145 These regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”146 The great
weight given to agency interpretation in this and other areas of banking law
lies in the expertise of a given agency. Further, courts have stressed that
they must afford deference to banking agencies so the agencies can
continue updating banking laws to fit the changing financial needs of both

141. See Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 335, 377, 378 (2012) (defining
“investment banking” as “the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities”).
142. Linda B. Matarese, Has the Chevron Deference Made a Difference When Courts
Review Federal Banking Agency Interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act?, 33 HOW. L.J. 195,
201 (1990) (noting a single instance where the Supreme Court rejected the FRB’s ruling); see Sec.
Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1984).
143. 411 U.S. 138, 138 (1973).
144. Id. at 143.
145. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 827, 843 (1984).
146. Id. Another area where banking agencies are afforded great deference is in cases
adjudicated on bank failures. See generally Franklin Savings Ass’n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991) (ruling in favor of the agency, finding “absent
extraordinary circumstances, the decision of the director as to what information he must review
should be left to his discretion”).
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consumers and banks.147 The preexisting high level of deference given to
banking agencies in other areas of banking law suggests it is feasible to
grant a similar level of deference to the FFIEC’s expertise in protecting
banks from being held liable for online banking fraud.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The costs of letting judges decide liability of banks based on arbitrary
factors may prove disastrous in the future, both for banks and their
customers. On the one hand, businesses may be reluctant to use online
banking services because they are worried they will lose their money if
fraudsters penetrate the bank’s system. On the other hand, a bank may be
held liable in one jurisdiction, while a bank with an identical security
procedure may be exempt from liability. Instead, when determining
liability of banks under the UCC, courts should follow the examples of
SEPA, the IBG roadshows, and other areas of banking law and defer to the
FFIEC’s analysis of the costs and benefits of different online fraud
prevention procedures.
With the support of the European governments and banking authorities,
the banks within the SEPA area streamlined their credit and debit transfer
procedures for the benefit of consumer transaction efficiency. Skeptics
argue uniform procedures could potentially lead to a flood of fraud attacks
if fraudsters penetrate the procedure. Nevertheless, even SEPA skeptics
find the benefits of unified fund transfers outweigh the potential risks of
fraud. If U.S. courts give greater weight to compliance with FFIEC
Guidance in determining liability, banks will be incentivized to follow more
streamlined fraud prevention procedures similar to the unified procedures
seen in the SEPA system.
To maximize the ability to work together, transparency is of utmost
importance in adopting uniform security procedures. Banks in the United
States should follow the example set by the “Experience IBG” roadshows in
Malaysia and other similar programs in achieving this goal. As in
Malaysia, these presentations should be organized through U.S. banking
institutions and organizations and catered to building consumer confidence.
Moreover, similar presentations should be scheduled for board members of
banks to help protect banks as well. The content for these presentations
should be drawn from interagency reports such as those drafted by the
FFIEC and from pending legislation. Using these sources will provide an
overview of preexisting technologies adopted by banks across the United
States. By fostering awareness through both consumers and the banks
147. Matarese, supra note 142, at 260.
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themselves in conjunction with FFIEC documents, banks will want to adopt
additional security procedures to attract new clients and protect themselves
from liability under the UCC’s “commercial reasonableness” standard.
Moreover, the banking agencies afforded deference in other areas of
banking law are the same ones that comprise the membership of the FFIEC.
It would not be a stretch, therefore, to grant the combined efforts of these
agencies a similar level of deference as they receive in these other areas in
adjudication of online banking fraud. While the FFIEC has only issued
Guidance documents in helping banks adopt security procedures, the courts
should look at the bank’s compliance with the Guidance suggestions as a
large factor in determining reasonableness under the UCC.
One major downside to relying on FFIEC Guidance is the significant
amount of time it still requires to produce the documents. A six-year period
elapsed between the first and second Guidance issuance. Given the rapid
rates of development of new technology and fraudster strategies, there may
be new technological advances that arise during the publication period that
are not accounted for within the Guidance. However, the Guidance
documents can still provide an overview of the categories of areas courts
should look for in determining the reasonableness of a bank procedure.148
This benefit alone will help promote unification between bank procedures
and build certainty for banks to protect themselves from liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
While many consumers are attracted to the convenience and speed of
online banking, it is important to remember its potential risk of fraud. In
the United States, banks are not liable for losses if they followed
“commercially reasonable” security procedures to verify the transaction.149
However, courts have only litigated the “commercial reasonableness” of
online banking security procedures a few times to date, and the costs of
relying solely on judicial discretion are too high. With an objective
reasonableness standard, such as that imposed by the UCC, it is to the
advantage of U.S. banks to maintain uniform online banking security
procedures. In working towards this uniformity, U.S. banks should follow
the examples set by SEPA in Europe and the “Experience IBG” roadshows
in Malaysia.

148. See About the FFIEC, supra note 55 (categorizing ideal security procedures into several
groups for banks to consider: layered security programs, device identification, challenge
questions, and malware).
149. U.C.C. § 4A-203 (1989).
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Specifically, both banks and courts should increasingly rely on the
Guidance promulgated by the FFIEC to determine reasonableness under the
UCC. This not only parallels the deference given to the SEPA governments
and the IBG roadshow organizers, but also reflects the prominent trend of
deference to banking agencies in other areas of American banking law.
These three comparative points serve as examples where the benefits of
regulation outweigh the costs of wide discretion in prevention techniques.
The FFIEC has the expertise to weigh the costs and benefits of
implementing certain fraud procedures in banks and publicize their findings
to banks and the public at large. By following these publications’ baselines
and alternatives analysis, banks can not only increase consumer confidence
in online banking but also protect themselves from liability in the future.

